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An examination is made of the differing implications from applying the two mainstream 
interpretations of probability, frequentist and Bayesian, to QM (quantum mechanics) theory. As a 
test bed, the Bohm-EPR experiment is chosen and the second-order joint probability distribution 
from QM theory that describes the possible spin outcomes for two particles with coupled spins is 
examined. Several contrasting conclusions are made: (i) Under the frequentist interpretation where 
probability distributions are viewed as properties of inherently random processes, the QM spin 
distribution implies a widely-discussed non-locality because probabilistic conditioning on a spin 
measurement is viewed as corresponding to a causal influence. Under the Bayesian interpretation 
where probability distributions are viewed as a measure of the relative plausibility of each possible 
spin outcome, this conditioning is viewed as providing information relevant to the spin 
probabilities and the argument for non-locality loses its force. (ii) The frequentist interpretation 
leads to the locality condition used by John Bell in 1964 to establish conditions for the existence of 
hidden variables behind the spin probability distribution. It is shown that this locality condition is 
not consistent with the product (Bayes) rule of probability theory. Under the Bayesian 
interpretation, there is no motivation for this locality condition, which fails to preserve cogent 
information coming from the correct probabilistic conditioning. Indeed, a new stochastic hidden-
variable model is given that reproduces the QM spin distribution, although it is not claimed that 
this model actually represents the underlying physics. (iii) As noted by some others and shown here 
using a simple proof that is independent of Bell’s locality condition, Bell’s original 1964 inequality 
involving expectations of pairs of spin variables does have an important role: it provides a 
necessary condition for the existence of a third-order joint probability distribution for three spin 
variables that is compatible through marginalization with the second-order joint distributions for 
the three possible spin pairs. An explicit expression is given here for this third-order distribution. 
Bell’s original inequality is also shown to be logically equivalent to the 1969 CHSH Bell inequality 
that involves expectations of pairs of four spin variables; this inequality must be satisfied in order 
for a fourth-order joint probability distribution for the four spin variables to exist. When any of 
these Bell inequalities are violated, a joint probability distribution for three spin outcomes fails to 
be valid because some of the probabilities are negative.  
 
Keywords: Bohm-EPR spin experiment, hidden-variable model, Bell inequalities, quantum 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
QM (quantum mechanics) is a probabilistic mechanics theory that is unlike other such theories in that 
probability was not explicitly built into its foundations. Soon after Erwin Schrödinger’s original 
publication (1926) in which the mysterious wave function emerged, Born (1926) postulated that the 
amplitude squared of the wave function for a particle should be viewed as a probability density function 
for the position of the particle. Later, Born’s postulate was put on a more rigorous mathematical 
foundation by von Neumann (1932) and Gleason (1957) as what is now called Born’s rule, which states 
that probabilities are given by certain inner products involving projections that act on the wave functions 
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representing states of a system. Of course, for a quantity to be called probability it is essential that it 
satisfy the axioms of probability theory. It has not been unambiguously demonstrated that Born’s rule 
does indeed imply satisfaction of all of the axioms. Ballentine (1986) addresses this issue. He argues that 
it is so, except that the product rule (Bayes rule) may not hold when it is applied to the values of 
incompatible variables whose corresponding operators do not commute. Goyal and Knuth (2011) 
explicitly derive Feynman’s rules (Feynman 1948) for path probabilities in QM and show that the rules 
are consistent with probability theory if an assumption from classical physics is dropped. For this paper, 
the widely-held assumption that Born’s rule does indeed deliver probabilities is accepted and the interest 
lies in how these probabilities should be interpreted.  
 
Although there is widespread agreement on the axioms of probability, the meaning of probability has 
been debated for more than two centuries. However, little attention was paid to this issue in the early 
history of QM because the dominant interpretation of probability at the time was the frequentist one, 
which views probability as a property of inherently random events that is exhibited through their relative 
frequency of occurrence. More recently, the original Bayesian interpretation of probability (Bayes 1763; 
Laplace 1774, 1812), which quantifies a degree of belief or plausibility of a proposition conditional on 
specified information, has seen a renaissance throughout science and engineering because of its generality 
as a means of quantifying uncertainty when the available information is insufficient to make precise 
predictions. This renaissance has not yet had much impact on the interpretation of QM, although two 
physicists, Richard T. Cox and Edwin T. Jaynes, have made profound contributions to the rigorous 
foundations of Bayesian probability as a multi-valued logic for quantitative plausible reasoning (Cox 
1946, 1961; Jaynes 1983, 2003). As a point of interest, two papers on the foundations of probability 
theory by Schrödinger show that he favored what would now be called a Bayesian interpretation of 
probability (Schrödinger 1947a,b). 
 
The purpose of this work is to examine the implications of the frequentist and Bayesian meanings of 
probability on the interpretation of QM. This goal addresses one of the Oxford Questions discussed at the 
2010 conference on Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality: “How do different concepts of 
probability contribute to interpreting quantum theory?” (Briggs et al. 2013). The examination is done by 
using the Bohm-EPR experimental setup as a testbed. This setup is paradigmatic for some of the apparent 
mysteries of QM and it has been extensively studied both theoretically and experimentally, with 
pioneering contributions made by Bell (1964, 1987). However, most of these studies have implicitly taken 
a frequentist, rather than a Bayesian, interpretation of the joint probability distribution for the particle 
spins in these experiments.  
 
In Section 2, the Bohm-EPR experimental setup is briefly presented to allow the paper to be self-
contained and accessible to a broader audience interested in the meaning of probability. The focus then 
shifts to describing the frequentist and Bayesian interpretations of probability, and discussing their very 
different conclusions regarding the important issue of quantum non-locality. In Section 3, the differing 
implications of the two meanings of probability on the possible existence of hidden variables in Bohm-
EPR experiments are investigated, along with the relevance of Bell inequalities. Bell’s locality condition 
is motivated by a frequentist perspective but its special factorizing of the joint probability of the spin 
outcomes is shown to violate the product rule of probability theory. A stochastic hidden variable model is 
then presented that reproduces the QM spin distribution and is consistent with the probability axioms. 
Finally in Section 3, the relevance of Bell inequalities to an interesting problem in probability theory is 
discussed, along with its implications for the QM spin probabilities. Section 4 gives concluding remarks. 
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2. BOHM-EPR EXPERIMENTS AND THE ISSUE OF QUANTUM NON-LOCALITY 
 
Quantum mechanics probability distribution for the singlet state of two coupled spins 
 
Consider the gedanken experiment that was proposed by Bohm (1951, pp. 614-619) as an alternative way 
to frame the argument put forth by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) that QM as it stands is an 
incomplete theory: there is a source that generates a particle that has a net spin of zero but immediately 
splits into two spin-½ charged particles, labeled A and B, that freely move apart in opposite directions. 
They each eventually enter a Stern-Gerlach (SG) device, with corresponding labels A and B, whose 
longitudinal axes lie along the line of motion of the particles. These devices can be rotated about their 
axes but their orientation is assumed known for each test. The “up” direction of devices A and B are 
denoted by unit directional vectors a and b, respectively, and they lie in a plane orthogonal to the 
longitudinal axes of the devices. The outcome of each SG device is unpredictable but binary: the particle 
is either deflected up or down. The corresponding outcomes are denoted by the binary variables A(a) = 1 
(spin up) or  −1  (spin down), and B(b) = 1 or  −1 , that is, “A(a)=1”, for example, denotes the proposition, 
or event, that for a particle entering SG device A oriented in direction a, the spin outcome is up. There is 
no widely accepted explanation for the indeterminacy in these spin outcomes. From a frequentist 
perspective, it is assumed to be due to inherent randomness. From a Bayesian perspective, it is assumed 
to be due to missing information. The implications of these differing perspectives are discussed in later 
sub-sections.  
 
QM theory, based on applying Born’s rule to a spin wave function ψss for the singlet state, provides a 
joint probability distribution over the four possible pairs of spin values given by (A(a), B(b)) = 
 (1,1),(1,−1),(−1,1) and (−1,−1)  (Sakurai 2011): 
  
P[A(a), B(b)]  =  
1
4 [1− A(a)B(b)a ⋅b] 
            =  
1
2
sin2(θ
ab
2)   if A(a) = B(b), 
                       or  
1
2
cos2(θ
ab
2)  if A(a) =  −B(b)                                                             (1) 
 
where  θab  is the angle between the unit vectors a and b. Although P[…] will be used to denote the 
probability of an event or proposition, it is convenient to use a shorter notation for probability 
distributions where P[A(a),B(b)] in (1) denotes a probability function that gives the probability that (A(a), 
B(b)) equals a binary pair from the set  {−1,1}×{−1,1} ; e.g. P[α,β] = P[A(a)=α and B(b)=β | a,b,ψss], 
where the conditioning indicates that a and b are assumed given and the two particles are in the singlet 
state defined by the wave function ψss. This conditioning is left as understood in the shorter notation. 
Similarly, P[A(a)|B(b)] denotes a conditional probability P[A(a)=α|B(b)=β,a,b,ψss] when the appropriate 
values (α,β) of the two spin variables are substituted for (A(a), B(b)).  
 
The marginal and conditional distributions corresponding to (1) may then be deduced for A(a) and B(b) 
(and, conversely, taking their product implies the joint distribution in (1)):  
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P[A(a)] =
 
P[
B(b)=−1
+1
∑ A(a),B(b)] = 1 2 ,  P[B(b)] =
 
P[
A(a)=−1
+1
∑ A(a),B(b)] = 1 2                                   (2) 
P[A(a) | B(b)] = P[B(b) | A(a)] = P[A(a), B(b)] / P[A(a)] =  
1
2
(1−A(a)B(b) a ⋅b)  
                        =  sin
2(θ
ab
2)   if A(a) = B(b), 
                      or   cos
2(θ
ab
2)  if A(a) =  −B(b)                                                            (3) 
 
The main focus of this work is on the two interpretations, along with their differing implications, of the 
probability distribution in (1), and so on the equivalent distributions in (2) and (3). The conditional 
probabilities in (3) directly imply a correlation between the outcomes at the two SG devices, which is also 
exhibited by the result that the covariance is given by: 
< A(a)B(b) >  !  E[A(a)B(b)]  !
 A(a)=−1
+1
∑ A(a)B(b)P[
B(b)=−1
+1
∑ A(a),B(b)]  =  sin
2(θ
ab
2)  −  cos
2(θ
ab
2)  
                       =  −cosθab = −a ⋅b                                         (4) 
and so does not factorize into <A(a)><B(b)> (= 0). The underlying reasons for this correlation between 
the spin outcomes have been widely discussed, often under the topics of quantum non-locality, quantum 
entanglement, Bell inequalities and hidden variables. As we will show, the meaning of this correlation 
depends critically on whether probability is interpreted using a frequentist or a Bayesian perspective. 
 
Using the frequentist interpretation of probabilities 
 
A fundamental aspect of the frequentist interpretation of probabilities, which is commonly applied to QM 
theory, is that probability distributions are viewed as real properties of inherently random processes. For a 
set of possible random events that can occur, the probability P[E] of an outcome being an event E in this 
set is defined to be the relative frequency of its occurrence in a sequence of n independent trials, repeated 
under similar conditions, as n increases indefinitely. This definition of probabilities looks straightforward 
but its apparent simplicity cloaks some underlying difficulties.   
 
In practice, it is often not possible to repeatedly perform a large number of independent trials and 
certainly not forever. The impracticality is even worse for continuous variables because they have an 
uncountable number of possible values; any attempt to directly establish to high precision the multi-
dimensional probability distribution for a higher-dimensional vector of continuous variables would 
require a prohibitively large number of repeated trials. The frequentist definition is therefore conceptual 
rather than practical, so let us put practical difficulties aside and focus on the theoretical soundness of the 
definition.  
 
The first point to notice is that it depends on an apparent limit as n → ∞ but this mathematical limit 
cannot be directly defined because that requires examining the limiting behavior of an expression for the 
nth outcome, which does not exist for a random sequence of outcomes. The motivation for the definition is 
the law of large numbers (De Groot 1975) but this requires a prior definition of probability and so it 
cannot be used to define probability.  
 
A second point is that the definition is based on an assumption that the same underlying conditions hold 
from trial to trial that somehow govern the randomness but it is not possible to define exactly what the 
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required conditions are that need to be maintained and how they would work to control the randomness. 
This difficulty also carries over to applying frequentist probability to a single event, which requires 
viewing it as a sample from an ensemble, a reference set of events that are of the same nature. This 
embedding of the single event in an ensemble is often not conceptually possible because of the 
unrepeatable nature of the event, but even if it is possible, the choice of the ensemble is usually non-
unique due to different possible choices of the conditions that the ensemble events must satisfy. This can 
lead to different probability distributions applied to the single event, such as in the stopping rule problem 
for sequential testing (O’Hagan and Forster 2004, p.121). 
 
The final, and perhaps most important, issue is that the definition rests on the metaphysical assumption of 
the existence of inherently random processes but their existence cannot be demonstrated. For a process 
that looks random, there is a fundamental difficulty in distinguishing whether it is due to inherent 
randomness (ontic or aleatory uncertainty) or due to epistemic uncertainty because of missing 
information. For example, the outcome of tossing a coin and letting it land on a table is often described as 
being an inherently random process. It does look random in the absence of any information but if the 
initial conditions were known precisely (i.e. initial location and orientation of the coin and its initial 
angular velocity and center of mass velocity), then the outcome could be predicted accurately by rigid-
body dynamics (e.g. Keller 1986). The apparent ontic uncertainty is actually epistemic uncertainty.  
 
The Bohm-EPR experiment is often said to demonstrate through the experimental violation of Bell 
inequalities that there are no hidden variables and so the spin outcomes must be due to inherent 
randomness. This conclusion is doubtful, however, because the connection between Bell inequalities and 
the existence of hidden variables in the Bohm-EPR experiment is based on questionable arguments, which 
will be elaborated on in Section 3.  
 
Applying the frequentist interpretation to the QM probabilities in (1)-(3), a conditional probability such as 
P[B(b)|A(a)] is viewed as an inherent physical property of the experimental setup. It is a logical inference 
from this premise that a measurement on the spin of one particle has a causal effect on the other particle. 
Thus, if A(a) is observed first, then it is implied that this outcome at SG device A must immediately 
establish the probability distribution P[B(b)|A(a)] for the outcome B(b) at SG device B; for the special 
case b=a, this implies that observing A(a)=1 must immediately cause B(a)= −1  (see (3)). The frequentist 
viewpoint therefore leads to the conclusion that there is a non-locality in Nature where an observation 
made by SG device A immediately affects the observation that will be made at SG device B. This 
apparent effect is sometimes referred to as a “superluminal quantum effect” (faster than the speed of 
light), while a skeptical Einstein called apparent behavior like this “spooky action at a distance” (Born 
1971). Brunner et al. (2014) give a review of quantum non-locality with an extensive list of references. 
No plausible mechanism has been produced for an instantaneous influence between two particles at an 
arbitrary distance apart, nor is there any direct experimental evidence of it. The implication of this non-
locality by the frequentist interpretation of probability therefore raises doubts about the validity of this 
interpretation. Other difficulties in applying frequentist probability have been widely discussed by 
statisticians (e.g. O’Hagan and Forster 2004), as well as physicists (e.g. Jaynes 1984; Loredo 1990). 
 
Using the Bayesian interpretation of probabilities 
 
The Bayesian interpretation of probability has a long history, starting with the paper by Thomas Bayes 
published posthumously in 1763 and the fundamental contributions of Pierre Simon Laplace, 
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commencing in 1774 and culminating in his 1812 treatise (Laplace 1774, 1812). Because of its rigorous 
foundations, we use a specific Bayesian interpretation of probability that is primarily due to the seminal 
work of the physicists Richard T. Cox and Edwin T. Jaynes in which probability is viewed as providing 
an extended logic for the quantification of plausible reasoning under incomplete information (Cox 1946, 
1961; Jaynes 1983, 2003). The probability P[b|c] is interpreted as the degree of plausibility of the 
proposition (statement) b based on the information stated in the proposition c, where c is only 
conditionally asserted but it cannot be self-contradictory (that is, it implies that a proposition is both true 
and false, and so is itself inherently false). Probability as a logic extends binary Boolean propositional 
logic, which is the special case where complete information is specified in a proposition c that gives the 
truth or falsity of b, that is, P[b|c]=1 or P[b|c]=0, respectively. For a quantitative propositional calculus 
for plausible reasoning, we need to evaluate the probabilities P[~b|c], P[a & b|c] and P[a or b|c] 
involving, respectively, a negation, a conjunction and a disjunction, in terms of more basic ones. These 
three probabilities correspond, respectively, to the degree of plausibility based on c that b is not true, that 
both a and b are true, and that either a or b (or both) are true. For this purpose, Cox (1946) postulated that 
universal negation, conjunction and disjunction functions of degrees of plausibility exist but he did not 
prescribe their explicit mathematical form. He then used the axioms of Boolean logic to derive the form of 
these universal functions. The result is that the calculus for treating uncertainty due to incomplete 
information is determined by the axioms for complete information to within an inconsequential smooth 
invertible mapping of the unit interval (Cox 1946; Jaynes 2003). 
 
Cox’s derived results can be stated as a minimal set of three axioms for probability as a logic (shortened 
here to probability logic): 
 
For any propositions a, b, c with c not being self-contradictory:   
(i)   P[b|c] ≥ 0  
(ii)  P[~b|c] = 1− P[b|c] 
(iii) P[a&b|c] = P[a|b&c]P[b|c] 
 
Here, (ii) gives the negation function and (iii) gives the conjunction function (product rule or Bayes rule). 
For (iii) to be valid, propositions b and c cannot be contradictory because then b&c is a self-contradictory 
proposition and so P[a|b&c] is undefined. The disjunction function (sum rule) can be derived from the 
last two axioms and De Morgan’s Law from Boolean logic (Cox 1946; Jaynes 2003):  
(iv) P[a or b|c] = P[a|c] + P[b|c]−  P[a & b|c] 
It is readily shown that these three axioms also imply that P[b|c]∈[0,1], which refines (i), and they lead to 
the well-known Marginalization, Total Probability and Bayes’ Theorems found in any text book on 
probability theory (e.g. De Groot 1975). An overview of a framework for the application of probability 
logic to uncertainty quantification and propagation for dynamical systems is presented in Beck (2010) and 
Beck and Taflanidis (2013). 
 
The axioms for a probability measure P(E) on subsets E of a finite set X, as stated by Kolmogorov (1950) 
and commonly given in textbooks on probability theory, can be derived as a special case of the probability 
logic axioms given above (Beck 2010). In Kolmogorov’s formulation, the product rule comes from his 
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definition of conditional probability as the ratio of two unconditional probabilities, a joint and a marginal, 
whereas in probability logic, all probabilities are conditional at the outset and the product rule is an 
axiom.  
 
If X denotes the set of possible values for an uncertain-valued variable x, then for any subset E of X, the 
probability measure P(E) is interpreted in probability logic as P[x∈E|π] where π denotes the proposition 
that states a probability model f(x) quantifying the relative plausibility of each value of x in X. The 
probability logic axioms therefore provide a calculus for handling stochastic variables, which is a 
terminology that is preferred for variables whose values are uncertain because of missing information, 
regardless of whether the variables correspond to physical quantities or to model parameters. The 
alternative terminology, random variables, which is common in frequentist probability theory, is not so 
appropriate in Bayesian probability theory because: (1) the fundamental concept is quantification of our 
uncertainty about both models and real events, and not describing Nature’s apparent randomness; and (2) 
the definitions of stochastic and random variables differ from a technical point of view. 
 
All probabilities interpreted from a Bayesian perspective are conditional on stated information, which at 
the very least must state, or logically imply, the probability models used to produce the values of the 
probabilities. Sometimes a probability is written in an unconditional form but this is only because the 
model being used for the probability distribution is not explicitly stated as conditioning information. 
Usually these models come from a theory, such as Born’s rule in QM, but if not, a defensible way of 
choosing a model that is sometimes appropriate is to apply Jaynes’ Principle of Maximum Entropy 
(Jaynes 1957) and maximize the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution subject to moment 
constraints. This principle avoids unjustified reductions in the uncertainty beyond that needed to enforce 
the constraints. From a Bayesian perspective, probabilistic conditioning is relevant information that 
informs the relative plausibility of the possible outcomes and it need not correspond to any direct causal 
connection with the outcomes. Jaynes (1989) gives a simple example of picking balls from an urn that 
nicely illustrates the distinction between causal dependence and information dependence. 
 
Probability distributions for stochastic variables are viewed as chosen, or derived, models representing 
our uncertainty about their values and not as properties of Nature’s “inherently random” events; indeed, 
the vague concept of inherent randomness, which needs to be postulated for the foundation of the 
frequentist approach, plays no role in probability logic. Instead, a pragmatic treatment of uncertainty for 
event outcomes is that the information needed to make perfect predictions is missing because of our 
limited capacity to access, or understand, the relevant information. In summary, Bayesian probability 
quantifies our uncertainty, and so it has an epistemic nature. It treats probability distributions as 
probability models for this purpose. On the other hand, frequentist probability is based on an ontological 
view where probability distributions are postulated to be real properties of inherently random events 
occurring in Nature, although in practice they are not known and must be modeled.  
 
A difficulty that a newcomer may have when encountering the Bayesian definition of probability as a 
degree of conditional belief, or more specifically in our case, as a logic for quantitative plausible 
reasoning, is that it appears to have a more abstract nature than the frequentist definition. Then it may be 
helpful to point out the connection between probability and frequency of events that arises naturally in a 
Bayesian setting in the case where experiments or natural phenomena are of the nature of repeated events. 
It is based on the general procedure of using relevant data about stochastic variables to update their prior 
probability distribution through Bayes’ Theorem. This connection can also be used to gain an 
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appreciation, or “calibration”, of a numerical probability value.  Take a Bernoulli probability model for 
predicting whether or not an event occurs, then the most probable value a posteriori of the model 
parameter θ that gives the probability of this event occurring is equal to the relative frequency of its 
occurrence in any finite number of trials, when all values of θ are equally plausible a priori. The full 
Bayesian posterior distribution for θ is a Beta distribution over [0,1], which becomes more and more 
concentrated at the relative frequency that the event occurs as the number of trials increases (O’Hagan and 
Forster 2004, pp.4-5, 242). Bayes’ Theorem can also be used to assess the probability of competing 
probability models based on relevant data; that is, one calculates the posterior probability for each model 
with respect to a set of proposed candidate models (Beck and Yuen 2004; Beck 2010). 
 
The Bayesian interpretation of the probability distributions in (1)-(3) is that they are models derived from 
QM theory to make predictions about the uncertain experimental outcomes based on incomplete 
information, rather than being inherent physical properties of the experiment. The joint probability 
distribution in (1), and its equivalent in the form of (2) and (3), is implicitly conditional on the assumption 
that the two spin-½ particles are in the singlet state, since it is the wave function for this state that 
provides the probability distribution through an application of Born’s rule.  
 
A plausible explanation for the indeterminacy in the outcome of an SG device is that the spin direction of 
a spin-½ particle entering it is rotated by the magnetic field into an up or down direction with the outcome 
depending on the unknown initial spin direction and perhaps also on the spin phase (that is, where it is in 
its spin cycle). In this sense, rather than an SG device measuring the spin of the particle, it actually 
transforms the spin into either spin up or spin down, referred to as the spin outcome in this work. From 
this perspective, the probability distribution in (1) gives probabilistic predictions of the spin outcomes of 
the pair of particles upon exiting the SG devices, and not, as often stated, the probabilities for pre-existing 
states of spin up and spin down of the two particles entering SG devices A and B. For example, the 
conditional probability P[B(b)|A(a)] in (3) is viewed as a derived model that gives a measure of the 
plausibility of the outcome B(b) based on either actual or hypothesized information about the outcome 
A(a); recall that here A(a) and B(b) are shorthand for the statements that they are equal to the particular 
values that are to be substituted (e.g. B(b) represents either the statement B(b)=1 or B(b)= −1 ).  
 
From the Bayesian perspective, conditioning in the probabilities for spin is viewed as providing 
information to be taken into account when making probabilistic predictions of the experimental spin 
outcomes, not as a causal influence of that outcome, so there is no implication that a measurement on 
particle A has any effect on particle B. This interpretation of conditional probability has also been 
advocated for QM by Jaynes (1989, 1990a,b), Fuchs (2003), De Raedt et al. (2007) and Grandy (2009). 
 
The marginal distributions in (2) imply that all spin directions are equally plausible in the absence of any 
other information. The probability model in (1), which is conditional on the two-particle wave function 
for the singlet state, would not be appropriate if, for example, the direction of the coupled spins at the 
source was known. Actually, (1) corresponds to some ideal behavior for a real experiment because it 
depends only on a geometric projection and not on any details of an SG device.  
 
Jaynes (1990a), Grandy (2009) and Goyal and Knuth (2011) have also advocated the Laplace-Cox-Jaynes 
approach to Bayesian probability as a probability logic for interpreting QM. Others have followed the 
alternative Ramsey-DeFinetti-Savage approach to subjective Bayesian probability (e.g. Fishburn 1986), 
which is based on betting odds, and is often referred to in the QM literature as Quantum Bayesianism or 
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QBism (e.g. Caves, Fuchs and Shack 2002; Fuchs 2003; Pitowsky 2003; Fuchs, Mermin and Schack 
2014). 
 
Global and local correlations: Bayesian information perspective 
 
Equivalent predictive probability model for spin outcome distribution 
 
To gain further insight into the probability distribution (1) (and hence (2) and (3)), an equivalent 
predictive probability model for the two spin outcomes is presented that is a decomposition into global 
and local model properties. A Bayesian perspective is taken, so the probability distributions in this section 
are viewed as probability models that quantify the relative plausibility of the possible spin outcomes. In 
particular, we discuss the interpretation of the joint distribution P[A(a),A(b)] of the incompatible 
variables A(a) and A(b), which in the frequentist approach is not meaningful because both events cannot 
simultaneously occur and so this probability distribution cannot be a real property of the events.  
 
Equivalence Theorem: 
For all possible directions a and b, the joint probability distribution P[A(a),B(b)] in (1) over 
 {−1,1}×{−1,1}  and the corresponding probability distribution implied by the following two properties, 
are equivalent: 
 
Property I (Conservation of Total Spin): For any direction a, A(a) = −B(a) = B( −a). 
 
Property II (Local Spin Correlation for a Stern-Gerlach Device): For SG device A, the uncertainty in 
predicting the spin outcomes for the device for any two chosen directions a and b, is described by the 
joint probability distribution: 
 
P[A(a), A(b)]  =  
1
4 [1+ A(a)A(b)a ⋅b] 
                        =  
1
2
cos2(θ
ab
2)  if A(a) = A(b), 
           or  
1
2
sin2(θ
ab
2)   if A(a) =  −A(b)                                                                                        (5) 
 
Property II is, in turn, equivalent to the conditional distribution: 
 
P[A(b) | A(a)] =  
1
2 [1+ A(a)A(b)a ⋅b] 
                        =  cos
2(θ
ab
2) if A(b) = A(a), 
                       or   sin
2(θ
ab
2)  if A(b) =  −A(a)                                                                       (6) 
 
along with the marginal distributions: P[A(a)] = 
1
2
= P[A(b)] (this follows from the same approach as 
showing that (2) and (3) are equivalent to (1)). 
 
Proof:  
 
Property I is implied by the conditional probability distributions (3) from QM theory.  
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If b = a so that  θab = 0, then from (3): 
P[B(a) | A(a)] = 0   if A(a) = B(a), 
                      or  1  if A(a) =  −B(a) 
so for sure, A(a) =  −B(a).  
If b =  −a so that  θab = π, then from (3): 
P[B( −a) | A(a)] = 1   if A(a) = B( −a), 
                          or  0  if A(a) =  −B( −a) 
so for sure, A(a) = B( −a). Then Property II follows by replacing B(b) in (1) by  −A(b).  
Conversely, we can simply substitute A(b) = −B(b) from Property I into Property II to get (1). 
 
Interpretation of Properties I and II  
 
Because of the Equivalence Theorem, a Bayesian interpretation of the QM probability distribution in (1) 
can be given in terms of Properties I and II. 
 
An interpretation of Property I is that each particle has the physical property of a spin direction and the 
spins are created in opposite directions at their source, then, because of total spin conservation, the 
outcomes at two aligned SG devices are the opposite (in the absence of intervening electromagnetic-
fields). Therefore, if SG device A produces A(a) = 1, then SG device B must produce B(a) =  −1 , while 
A(a) =  −1  implies that B(a) = 1. This prediction based on the outcome at A can be made regardless of 
whether the companion particle has arrived at B or not; that is, the outcome at A provides information 
implying what the spin outcome at B will be, or actually is, regardless of the sequential order that the 
experimental outcomes occur. The model states, in effect, that when the two SG devices are aligned, it is 
spin conservation (total spin of zero) that provides the relevant information to infer the global correlation 
exhibited by the joint probability distribution in (1) for the predicted spin outcomes for particles A and B. 
This property is therefore the source of the quantum entanglement between the pair of spins.  
 
Property II accounts for the partial mutual information between the spin outcomes from a single SG 
device. Although the two spin variables involved cannot be simultaneously observed for a particle, 
Property II can be readily interpreted. Consider first the conditional distribution in (6). Under the 
hypothesis that a particle entering SG device A along its longitudinal axis would produce spin up if the 
SG device was oriented in direction a, so that A(a) = 1, the probability that it would produce spin up for a 
new direction b, which is at an angle of rotation  θab  about its longitudinal axis from direction a, is 
 cos
2(θ
ab
2) . Under the same hypothesis, the probability that it would produce spin down for direction b, 
is  1− cos
2(θ
ab
2) = sin2 (θ
ab
2) . Similarly, under the hypothesis that A(a) =  −1 , the probabilities of the 
outcomes of spin down and spin up for direction b are  cos
2(θ
ab
2)  and  sin
2(θ
ab
2) , respectively. The 
value of the spin variable A(a) in the conditioning in (6) may be hypothesized or inferred to provide 
partial information for predicting the spin outcome A(b). If, for example, B(a) =  −1  is the outcome at  
SG device B, then Property I implies that A(a) = 1. The conditional distribution in (6) therefore reveals a 
local correlation between the spin outcomes for any two directions of an SG device, which means that the 
specification of one of the spin outcomes provides information about what the other spin outcome would 
be. It is a local correlation because for Property II, the two directions a and b are for the same SG device.  
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As the direction b is rotated away from that of a through an angle  θab , the given information about the 
outcome A(a) in (6) initially becomes of decreasing relevance and the uncertainty in A(b) increases. This 
increase is reflected in the conditional Shannon entropy for A(b) (Cover and Thomas 1991), which is a 
measure of uncertainty in the value of A(b), given A(a), due to missing information. This entropy 
increases from zero at  θab = 0 to 1 bit at  θab = π/2 where the probabilities for A(b) = 1 and A(b) =  −1 , 
conditional on A(a), are both equal to 1/2. Then the uncertainty, and hence the entropy of A(b), begins to 
decrease with further rotation until it is zero when b = −a, where the rotation angle is  θab = π and Property 
II implies the definite outcome that A(b) =  −A(a), that is, for sure A( −a) =  −A(a). 
 
The marginal probability distributions for A(a) and A(b) implied by Property II state that in the absence 
of any information about the spins, spin up and spin down are equally plausible, that is, for any direction 
a, P[A(a)] =  
1
2
 for A(a) = 1 or  −1 . This distribution has a Shannon entropy of 1 bit, the largest entropy 
possible for a binary variable. Any other distribution for P[A(a)] would give smaller entropy, 
corresponding to a reduction in uncertainty that is not supported by any corresponding gain in 
information.  
 
The local correlation specified by (5) can also be quantified by the mutual information I between A(a) and 
A(b) (Cover and Thomas 1991): 
 
I[A(a),A(b)]=
A(a )=−1
+1
∑ P[A(a),A(b)]
A(b)=−1
+1
∑ log2 P[A(a),A(b)]P[A(a)]P[A(b)] =
1
2 log2(1− x
2 )+ 12 x log2
(1− x)
(1+ x)
             (7) 
where scalar  x = a ⋅b . The mutual information I(x) is an even function of x and it is always positive 
except when a and b are orthogonal where I(x) has its minimum value of zero. It reaches a maximum 
value of 1 bit when b = a or b =  −a, which are the two cases where the value of A(a) implies the value of 
A(b), and conversely. 
 
We conclude that, from a Bayesian perspective, the combination of the global and local correlations from 
Properties I and II, respectively, explains the relevance of the information from the spin outcome at one 
SG device to the probabilistic prediction of the outcome at the other device, without invoking any 
postulate about non-locality (instantaneous influence at a distance). 
 
 
3. BOHM-EPR EXPERIMENTS: HIDDEN VARIABLES AND BELL INEQUALITIES 
 
Under the frequentist interpretation of probabilities 
 
The question of whether a hidden-variable model can explain the joint probability distribution in (1) for 
the pair of spin outcomes has a long history in which a prominent role is played by Bell inequalities, so 
named because the first such inequality was published by John Bell (1964). Bell inequalities are usually 
expressed in terms of covariances on three or four pairs of spin outcomes for Bohm-EPR experiments. 
They were originally derived under the assumption of hidden variables behind the indeterminacy of the 
spin outcomes in these experiments where the uncertainty in the values of the hidden variables is 
represented by a probability distribution. A specific locality assumption made by Bell is critical to these 
derivations. The inequalities are not satisfied by the covariances from QM that are given in (4) under 
some choices of the orientations of the two SG devices. The experimental evidence based on using sample 
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covariances from multiple experiments to approximate the theoretical covariances in the Bell inequalities 
is usually taken as implying that the inequalities are violated. This has produced a commonly-held belief 
that there can be no hidden variables behind the QM results in (1), so we briefly review this argument. 
 
Bell’s locality condition and implied covariance inequalities 
 
Bell (1964, 1981) assumed that if hidden variables (that is, properties associated with the particles) can 
explain the correlations exhibited in (1), then the following locality condition (also called the 
factorizability or factorability condition) must apply: 
 
P[A(a), B(b)| λ ,a,b] = P[A(a)| λ ,a] P[B(b)| λ ,b]                                                                                        (8) 
 
where λ  denotes the hypothesized hidden variables for the two “coupled” particles (“hidden” because 
they are not known explicitly). This factorization implies that A(a) and B(b) are independent conditional 
on λ  and so the conditional mean of the product is the product of the conditional means: 
 
<A(a)B(b)| λ ,a,b> = <A(a)| λ ,a> <B(b)| λ ,b>                                                                                           (9) 
 
Bell’s justification of his locality condition is that the orientation and outcome of SG device B should 
have no causal influence over the outcome of SG device A because of their physical separation. His 
argument is consistent with the frequentist interpretation of probability where conditional distributions are 
viewed as real properties of the experimental setup and the conditioning is viewed as a causal influence 
on the spin outcomes. The independences of P[A(a)| λ ,a] from b and from B(b) that are assumed in (8) 
are often called parameter and outcome independence, respectively (Shimony 1990).  
 
Bell (1964) actually states his locality condition as a deterministic version of (8) that he calls the “vital 
assumption” that the outcome B(b) for the particle at SG device B should not depend on the setting a for 
SG device B and uses the notation A(a,λ) and B(b,λ). He also imposes the condition A(a,λ) = −B(a,λ), 
as in Property I. Later in Bell (1981), he again states that the outcomes at the two separated SG devices 
should not have any causal influence over each other but now expresses this fact in the probabilistic form 
in (8), presumably so that the outcomes at SG devices A and B need not necessarily be known when the 
orientations a and b and the hidden variable λ  are known, as he appears to assume in his 1964 paper. Bell 
showed that his locality condition leads to the following inequality in terms of three covariances: 
 
| <A(a)B(b)>  −  <A(a)B(c)> |  −  <A(b)B(c)>  ≤  1                                                                                 (10) 
 
where a, b and c are directions chosen for SG devices A and B and there is a total of three different 
Bohm-EPR experiments.  
 
Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (1969) derived another inequality using a similar approach to that in 
Bell (1964). The CHSH inequality involves four directions a, b, c and d for SG devices A and B and a 
total of four Bohm-EPR experiments: 
 
| <A(a)B(b)>  −  <A(a)B(c)>  +  <A(d)B(b)>  +  <A(d)B(c)> |  
≤  | <A(a)B(b)>  −  <A(a)B(c)> |  +  | <A(d)B(b)>  +  <A(d)B(c)> |  ≤  2                                                (11) 
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The first inequality in (11) is obvious. A simple proof of the second one based on (8) is given in Goldstein 
et al. (2011, p.8).  
 
We show now that the Bell and CHSH inequalities in (10) and (11) are actually logically equivalent if, 
following Bell (1964), we assume that Property I holds. Set d = b in (11) so that <A(d)B(b)> =  −1 
because then A(d)=A(b)= −B(b) from Property I, implying that the final term in (11) is:  
| <A(d)B(b)>  +  <A(d)B(c)> | = 1  −  <A(b)B(c)>,  
giving (10). Conversely, if we sum two Bell inequalities, one given by a, b and c as in (10), and the other 
by replacing them in order with d, b and  − c in (10), then using B( −c)= −B(c) from Property I, we get 
the CHSH inequality in (11).  
 
It is well known since their introduction that the Bell inequalities in (10) and (11) are violated for some 
choices of the directions by the QM distribution in (1). To first show this for (10), substitute the QM 
covariance expression in (4) into each term, then (10) can be expressed as: 
 
|  cosθab  −  cosθac |  +   cosθbc ≤  1 
By taking  θab = θbc = π /4 , so that  θac =π /2 , the left-hand side is  2  and the inequality is violated. 
Similarly, substituting the QM covariance expression in (4) into each term in (11), the CHSH inequality 
can be expressed as: 
 
|  cosθab   −   cosθac   +   cosθdb   +   cosθdc |  ≤  2 
then for  θab = θdb = θdc = π /4 , so that θac =3π /4 , the left-hand side is 2 2  and the inequality is violated. 
Actually, it is readily argued using continuity that there is a continuum of allowable values for the angles 
for which both inequalities are not satisfied.  
 
To examine whether the experimental data on spin outcomes implies that the Bell inequalities are violated 
for some device orientations, each theoretical covariance, which corresponds to a single experimental set-
up, is estimated by using sample covariances over many experiments. These empirical estimates of the 
theoretical covariances are then substituted into the CHSH inequality in (11). Most of these experiments 
have been performed using polarization of photons rather than spin-½ particles (e.g. Aspect et al. 1981, 
1982; Shalm et al. 2015), so the experiments involve the spin-1 version of (1) where ½ θab  is replaced by 
 θab , but recently electron spins have been used (Hensen et al. 2015). The combined experimental evidence 
is taken to suggest that the CHSH inequality for photons and electrons is violated for certain choices of 
the orientations of the measuring devices, consistent with QM. It is then concluded that hidden variables 
that would explain the probability distribution (1) do not exist. This conclusion depends critically on the 
assumption that if hidden variables λ  exist, then the locality condition in (8) must hold, and the inference 
that the experimental results imply that (8) is violated for some choices of orientations. 
 
Bell’s locality condition violates the product rule 
 
Actually, the factorizability (conditional independence) in (8) is fundamentally invalid because it is never 
possible for a hidden variable to provide all of the information that correct probabilistic conditioning 
provides, which is given by the product (Bayes) rule from probability theory: 
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P[A(a),B(b)| λ ,a,b] = P[A(a)|B(b),λ ,a,b] P[B(b)|λ ,a,b] = P[A(a)|λ ,a,b] P[B(b)| A(a),λ ,a,b]               (12) 
 
For Bell’s locality condition in (8) to be consistent with (12) requires that P[A(a)|B(b),λ ,a,b] = 
P[A(a)|λ ,a] but this equivalence is not compatible with Property I, the conservation of total spin, as 
shown next.  
 
Consider the probability for A(a)=1 given that B(b)=1, and first set b=a, then from Property I, 
A(a)= −B(a)= −B(b)= −1, so P[A(a)=1| B(b)=1,λ ,a=b] = 0, regardless of the value of λ , which is set 
only by the source of the particles and has nothing to do with the settings of the SG devices. If instead 
b=  − a is chosen, then A(a)=  − B(a)=B(  − a)=B(b)=1, so P[A(a)=1| B(b)=1,λ ,a=  − b] = 1. Thus, 
representing the probability P[A(a)=1| B(b)=1,λ ,a,b] as P[A(a)=1| λ ,a] is not valid because its value 
depends on the direction b, which provides relevant information for the probability of A(a)=1 and so it 
cannot be dropped from the conditioning. When discussing the Bohm-EPR experiment, Jaynes (1989) 
noted that (12) is the correct factorization of the joint distribution according to the product rule but the 
implied incompatibility with Bell’s locality condition under Property I does not seem to have been 
previously noticed.  
 
Property I is not needed to prove the CHSH inequality (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2011, p.8). If it is dropped, 
however, then Bell’s class of hidden variable models is inconsistent with the QM distribution in (1) at the 
outset. Such a class of models should therefore be of little interest. The essential point, though, is that 
Bell’s locality condition does not apply to any class of hidden variable models that satisfies both the 
product rule for probabilities and Property I, the conservation of total spin. This fact is independent of 
whether the frequentist or Bayesian interpretation of probability is chosen. 
 
Under the Bayesian interpretation of probabilities 
 
From the perspective of Bayesian probability, the conditioning in (12) is viewed as relevant information 
for probabilistic predictions of the spin outcomes, rather than a causal influence on these outcomes. Thus, 
there is no concern about either superluminal propagation of effects or the need to show that there can be 
no instantaneous signaling by well-separated operators each using an SG device in a Bohm-Bell 
experimental setup. The underlying physical reason for the global correlation is the conservation of spin 
for the two particles.  Furthermore, since Bell’s locality condition in (8) is not applicable, the issue of 
whether hidden variables can explain the probability distribution in (1) is not settled by the experimental 
violation of the CHSH inequality using sample covariances that are constructed from multiple tests. To 
show that it is doubtful that any theorem can be developed to rule out hidden variables, a simple hidden 
variable model is presented, although it is not claimed that this model actually represents the underlying 
physics. 
 
Stochastic hidden variable model 
 
A stochastic hidden-variable model consistent with the joint probability distribution in (1) can be 
constructed as follows. Since (1) is equivalent to Properties I and II, and Property I has already been given 
a hidden-variable interpretation in terms of the two particles being created with opposite spin directions 
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that explain the global correlation, we focus on Property II. We wish to demonstrate that there could exist 
hidden variables that explain the distribution P[A(a),A(b)] in (5) for an SG device.  
 
Introduce the binary stochastic variable C(a,b) = A(a)A(b) with a distribution motivated by (5): 
 
P[C=1| a,b] =  
1
2 (1 + a ⋅b)    and   P[C= −1| a,b] =  
1
2 (1− a ⋅b)  
 
or, in the simpler notation introduced in Section 1:  P[C| a,b] =  
1
2 (1 + Ca ⋅b) . 
 
Next, define the conditional joint distribution P[A(a),A(b)|C] as in Table 1. Notice that these probabilities 
do not depend explicitly on the device settings a and b. Also, the marginal distribution for P[A(a),A(b)|C] 
is P[A(a)|C] =  
1
2  and so from Table 1, the conditional distribution P[A(b)|A(a),C] is deterministic (either 
0 or 1), as expected, since if both C = A(a)A(b) and A(a) are specified, then A(b) is known.  
 
From the Total Probability Theorem and Table 1:  
 
P[A(a),A(b)| a,b] = 
 
P[A(a),A(b) | C]
C=−1
+1
∑  P[C| a,b]  
           =  
1
4 (1 + a ⋅b)   if A(a) = A(b), 
                      or  
1
4 (1− a ⋅b)    if A(a) =  −A(b)                                                           (13) 
 
which is the probability distribution in (5).  
 
Table 1. Probability distribution P[A(a),A(b)| C] where C = A(a)A(b). 
 
(A(a),A(b)) (+ 1,+ 1) (+ 1, −1) ( −1,+ 1) ( −1, −1) 
C= + 1       
1
2       0      0       
1
2  
C= −1      0       
1
2        
1
2       0 
 
 
A hidden variable is now introduced for C as follows. Let λ  be a unit vector defining a direction, or, 
equivalently, defining a point on the surface S of an imaginary sphere of unit radius moving with the 
particle at its center. Roughly speaking, λ  is like a spin direction for the particle. Partition the total surface 
S into two simply connected regions, S+(a,b) and S−(a,b), of areas 2π (1 + a ⋅b)  and 2π  (1− a ⋅b) , 
respectively. Take the conditional probabilities:  
 
P[C=1|λ ,a,b] = 1   if  λ∈S+(a,b)           and      P[C= −1|λ ,a,b] = 1   if  λ∈S−(a,b) 
          = 0   if  λ∈S−(a,b)                                                  = 0   if  λ∈S+(a,b)                                 (14) 
 
Take the hidden variable λ  as uniformly distributed over the surface S and denote the probability density 
function for this distribution by p(λ). It does not depend on the device settings a and b. It follows that 
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 P[λ ∈S+ (a,b)]=
1
2 (1 + a ⋅b)  (it is the ratio of the area of S+(a,b) to the total area 4π of S) and, similarly, 
 P[λ ∈S− (a,b)]=
1
2 (1− a ⋅b) , so 
 
P[C=1| a,b] =
 
P[C = 1| λ,a,b]∫  p(λ) dλ = p(λ) dλS +∫ = P[λ ∈S+ (a,b)] = 12 (1 + a ⋅b)   
P[C= −1| a,b] = 
P[C = −1| λ,a,b]∫  p(λ) dλ = p(λ) dλS−∫ = P[λ ∈S− (a,b)] = 12 (1− a ⋅b)                          (15) 
 
Substituting the results in (15) into (13) gives a stochastic hidden-variable model for (5) of the form: 
 
P[A(a),A(b)| a,b] = 
 
P[A(a),A(b) | λ,a,b]∫  p(λ) dλ                                                                                (16a) 
P[A(a),A(b)| λ , a,b] = 
 
P[A(a),A(b) | C]
C=−1
+1
∑  P[C| λ,a,b]                                                                         (16b) 
 
Given λ , C is known from (14), so then the joint probability of A(a) and A(b) is known from Table 1.  
 
By substituting A(b)= −B(b) from Property I throughout this subsection, (15) also gives a stochastic 
hidden-variable model for (1). 
 
Significance of Bell’s inequality in probability theory 
 
Given that Bell’s locality condition is invalid, it may look as if the Bell inequalities are irrelevant. It is a 
remarkable fact, however, that the Bell inequalities in (10) and (11) have a fundamental role in probability 
theory that is unrelated to Bell’s locality condition or hidden variables. As noted by Hess and Philipp 
(2005), it was shown in the mathematical literature before Bell’s work (e.g. Bass 1955; Vorob’ev 1962) 
that the inequality in (10) is part of a necessary condition for the existence of a valid third-order 
probability distribution P[A(a), A(b), B(c)] for the three binary stochastic variables A(a), A(b)= −B(b) 
and B(c) that gives by marginalization three second-order probability distributions for the three possible 
pairs of these variables. Furthermore, Fine (1982) showed that the existence of a valid fourth-order 
probability distribution P[A(a), A(d), B(b), B(c)] directly implies the eight inequalities on the second-
order joint probabilities that were first derived by Clauser and Horne (1974) based on Bell’s locality 
condition. Furthermore, these eight probability inequalities can be expressed in terms of covariances, 
leading to two CHSH inequalities implied by (11) by removing the absolute values, as well as six others 
that are just permutations of the directions a, b, c, and d in these two inequalities. The CHSH inequality in 
(11) is therefore a necessary condition for the existence of a valid fourth-order joint distribution for the 
four spin variables. If (11) is violated, a third-order joint distribution fails to exist because it has negative 
probabilities and so, therefore, the fourth-order joint does not exist as well (a valid fourth-order joint 
implies all four third-order joints exist from marginalizations over each of the four variables).  
 
A simple proof of these results is given in the Appendix. By taking A=A(a), B=A(b) and C=A(c) in (A6) 
and (A7), a necessary condition for the existence of a valid joint distribution P[A(a), A(b), A(c)] that is 
compatible with three specified second-order joint distributions P[A(a),A(b)],  P[A(a),A(c)],  and 
P[A(b),A(c)] can be expressed in terms of the corresponding covariances as: 
 
| <A(a)A(b)> + <A(a)A(c)> | −<A(b)A(c)>  ≤  1                                                                                  (17a) 
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| <A(a)A(b)> −<A(a)A(c)> | + <A(b)A(c)>  ≤  1                                                                          (17b) 
 
If at least one of the two Bell inequalities in (17) is not satisfied, then a valid third-order distribution for 
A(a), A(b) and A(c) does not exist because at least one of the joint probabilities is negative. Bell’s 
inequality in (10) corresponds to using Property I to substitute A(b) = −B(b) into the first term of (17b) 
and A(c) = −B(c) in the second and third terms of (17b), so it is a necessary condition for a valid joint 
distribution P[A(a), B(b), B(c)] or P[A(a), A(b), B(c)].  
 
If in addition to the above substitutions for A, B and C, we also set D=A(d) in (A10), then: 
 
| <A(a)A(b)  −  <A(a)A(c)> | + | <A(d)A(b)> + <A(d)A(c)> |  ≤  2                                                         (18) 
 
is a necessary condition for a valid joint distribution P[A(a), A(b), A(c), A(d)]. If Property I is used to 
substitute A(b) = −B(b) and A(c) = −B(c), then (18) corresponds to the CHSH inequality (11). Therefore, 
if (11) is not satisfied, then the conclusion after (A10) implies that a valid fourth-order joint P[A(a), A(d), 
B(b), B(c)] does not exist because some of the probabilities are negative. 
 
Under symmetry of the probability distributions with respect to flipping the spin labels { −1,1} that are 
the binary values of A(a), A(b) and A(c), it is shown in the Appendix that (17a) and (17b) together give a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of P[A(a), A(b), A(c)]. Furthermore, there is always a 
unique mathematical solution for the third-order distribution P[A(a),A(b),A(c)] that gives, by 
marginalization, three specified second-order distributions, P[A(a),A(b)], P[A(b),A(c)] and P[A(a),A(c)]. 
This third-order joint distribution is given by (A9) in the Appendix by substituting A=A(a), B=A(b) and 
C=A(c). In the case of QM, where the second-order joint distributions are given by (1), this compatible 
third-order distribution given by (A9) can be written as: 
 
P[A(a),A(b),A(c)] = 
 
1
8
1+ A(a)A(b) a ⋅ b +A(b)A(c) b ⋅c +A(c)A(a) c ⋅a⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥                                         (19) 
 
where the covariances in (A9) have been expressed by using (4), noting that B(b) = −A(b) by Property I.  
 
In the case of the second-order joint distributions given by QM, we know that there exists coplanar 
directions a, b and c for which at least one of the inequalities (17a) or (17b) is not satisfied. For these 
directions, the implied third-order joint distributions are not valid because some of the probabilities are 
negative. A similar conclusion applies to the CHSH inequality (11), which under Property I effectively 
involves the four variables A(a), A(b), A(c) and A(d) and therefore requires a fourth-order joint 
probability distribution, P[A(a), A(b), A(c), A(d)]. If (11) is not satisfied, a third-order joint distribution 
fails to exist because it has negative probabilities and so, therefore, the fourth-order joint does not exist as 
well (a valid fourth-order joint implies all four third-order joints exist).   
 
Only a pair of directions, say a and b for SG devices A and B, respectively, can be examined in any one 
experiment and QM theory delivers a joint probability distribution that applies to predicting the outcomes 
A(a) and B(b)= −A(b). The fact that the theory cannot provide third or higher joint distributions for 
predicting the spin outcomes for some choices of three or more different SG device orientations is 
therefore not a deficiency from the perspective of predicting outcomes in any one Bohm-EPR experiment. 
However, it is puzzling that for some orientations, QM delivers probabilistic predictions for A(a) and 
A(b)= −B(b) in the absence of any information (since P[A(a),A(b)] exists), but not under the information 
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that A(c)= −B(c) is known (because P[A(a),A(b)|A(c)] = P[A(a),A(b),A(c)]/P[A(c)] fails to exist). For 
other choices of SG device orientations, these unconditional and conditional second-order joint 
distributions both exist, despite the fact that A(a) and A(b) are incompatible variables and their spin 
operators do not commute, so QM theory is not expected to deliver such joint probabilities. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Bohm-EPR gedanken experiment serves as an important test bed to examine the differing 
implications of the two principal meanings of axiomatic probability, frequentist and Bayesian, on 
interpretations of QM theory. The focus is on the probability distribution derived from Born’s rule for the 
spin outcomes of two particles with coupled spins in the singlet state that  are produced by separated SG 
(Stern-Gerlach) devices.  
 
It is argued that the widely-discussed apparent non-locality based on the implied probabilistic spin 
correlations from QM is a consequence of the frequentist interpretation of the probabilities: a probability 
distribution is viewed as a real property of “inherent randomness” and so conditioning in the probabilities 
for an event is viewed as playing a causal role for the event. Therefore, observing the spin outcome at one 
device immediately influences the spin outcome at the other device, although no plausible mechanism has 
been presented for such a superluminal effect. From a Bayesian perspective, the probabilistic spin 
correlations mean that the spin outcome (actual or hypothesized) at one SG device provides information 
relevant to the probability for predicting the spin outcome at the other device, and there is no motivation 
to postulate any non-local effect. It is argued that the predicted spin correlations have both a local and a 
global component and the source of the global correlations is the conservation of the total spin of the two 
spin-coupled particles, which is therefore also the source of the quantum entanglement. 
 
For the question of whether a hidden-variable model can explain the joint probability distribution for the 
pair of spin outcomes that is given by QM theory, it is argued that Bell inequalities are irrelevant. Bell’s 
locality (factorability/factorizability) condition that he and others have used to establish inequalities that 
must be satisfied for the existence of hidden variables behind the spin probability distribution is motivated 
by the frequentist interpretation of probability. However, it is inconsistent with the product rule of 
probability theory. This leaves as an open question the possible existence of hidden variables behind the 
QM spin distribution. Indeed, a stochastic hidden variable model is presented that reproduces this 
distribution and is consistent with the probability axioms, although it is not claimed that this model 
actually represents the underlying physics. 
 
Bell inequalities do have an important role: they give a necessary condition for the existence of a third-
order (or fourth-order) joint probability distribution for the spin outcomes that has as marginal 
distributions, three (or four) QM second-order joint probabilities. A simple proof of this result that does 
not use Bell’s locality condition is given. For choices of the orientations of the SG devices where Bell 
inequalities are not satisfied, some of the third-order joint probabilities become negative. Repeated 
experiments with a pair of orientations (a,b) can be used to check the joint probability distribution for 
A(a) and B(b) from QM by using the sample moments to estimate the corresponding theoretical moments 
in equation (A8). However, performing a set of separate experiments for each of three or four pairs of 
orientations, (a,b), (b,c) and so on, and then substituting the sample moments into the Bell inequalities 
(10) or (11), cannot be used to check for the existence of hidden variables underlying the spin distribution. 
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In summary, the frequentist interpretation of probability treats probability distributions as real properties 
of random phenomenon that control the long-term behavior of apparently random events through some 
invisible hand. In QM, this interpretation leads to apparent quantum non-locality and to Bell’s locality 
condition that violates the product rule of probability theory. From the perspective of E.T Jaynes, the 
frequentist interpretation of probability is an example of what he calls the Mind-Projection Fallacy where 
models of reality are confused with reality (Jaynes 1990a,b, 2003).  
 
If the Bayesian interpretation of probability is chosen, there is no motivation for quantum non-locality or 
Bell’s locality condition. Probability distributions are then viewed pragmatically as probability models for 
predicting outcomes that are uncertain because there is insufficient information available for precise 
predictions, and conditioning in probability distributions is viewed as information to be used in inferences 
and not as representing a causal influence. The adoption of the Bayesian point of view leads to less 
puzzling interpretations of QM theory than the frequentist perspective in understanding quantum 
entanglement in the Bohm-EPR experiment. It also has important implications for understanding other 
aspects of QM, such as the quantum measurement problem. 
 
 
APPENDIX: Bell inequalities and existence of third and fourth order distributions 
 
Let A, B and C be any three binary stochastic variables whose possible values are { −1,1}. If a third-order 
joint distribution exists for A, B and C, then it can be expressed in the form:  
 
P[A=α,B=β,C=δ] = ⅛[1 + α<A> + β<B> + δ<C> + αβ<AB> + βδ<BC> + αδ<CA> + αβδ<ABC>] 
 
where α, β, δ = +1 or  −1, or, equivalently, using the shorthand notation for probability functions: 
 
P[A,B,C] =  
1
8 [1 + A<A> + B<B> + C<C> + AB<AB> + BC<BC> + CA<CA> + ABC<ABC>]        (A1) 
 
This result can be shown by noting that it is the unique solution for the eight probabilities defining the 
distribution that satisfies normalization and the seven moment equations.  
 
Suppose now that the values of the seven moments are specified in the interval [ −1,1] and we ask if (A1) 
gives a valid probability distribution. This depends on whether all eight probabilities lie in the interval 
[0,1]. Clearly, these probabilities are bounded above by 1 because the magnitude of each of the eight 
terms inside the bracket in (A1) is bounded above by 1. However, depending on the specified values of 
the moments, P[A,B,C] may be negative. Necessary and sufficient conditions for P[A,B,C] to be a valid 
probability distribution for specified values of the seven moments are the eight conditions on the moments 
implied by the right-hand side of (A1) being non-negative as A,B and C range over  −1 and 1. These 
eight conditions come in four pairs where each pair corresponds to switching the sign of each component 
of the triplet (A,B,C), namely pairs (1, −1, −1) and ( −1,1,1), (1,1,1) and ( −1, −1, −1), (1, −1, 1) and 
( −1,1, −1), and (1,1, −1) and ( −1, −1,1). If we sum each such pair, we get four Bell inequalities 
involving only the second-order moments: 
 
<AB> + <BC> + <AC>  ≥   −1                                                                                                               (A2) 
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<AB> −<BC> −<AC>  ≥   −1                                                                                                   (A3) 
 −<AB> + <BC> −<AC>  ≥   −1                                                                                                   (A4) 
 −<AB> −<BC> + <AC>  ≥   −1                                                                                                   (A5) 
 
These four inequalities can be reduced to two equivalent inequalities that each have a similar form to the 
original 1964 Bell inequality in (10) by combining (A2) and (A4), and (A3) and (A5): 
 
| <AB> + <AC> |  −  <BC>  ≤  1                                                                                                               (A6) 
| <AB>  −  <AC> | + <BC>  ≤  1                                                                                                               (A7) 
 
Satisfaction of these two Bell inequalities is therefore necessary for a valid third-order distribution for 
(A,B,C). If either of them is violated, then a valid third-order distribution for (A,B,C) does not exist with 
the three specified second moments. 
 
If the three second-order distributions P[A,B], P[B,C] and P[C,A] are given, which imply the marginal 
distributions P[A], P[B] and P[C], then it follows that the first six moments are specified because  
 
P[A,B] =  
1
4 [1 + A<A> + B<B>  + AB<AB>],   P[A] =  
1
2 [1 + A<A>], etc.                                            (A8) 
 
Then with an arbitrary choice of the third moment <ABC>, the third-order distribution P[A,B,C] given by 
(A1) will be a valid one provided all eight probabilities are non-negative. The necessary conditions for 
this to hold are then satisfaction of (A6) and (A7), which can also be expressed in terms of probabilities 
by using (A8) to replace the moments.  
 
In the special case where the joint probabilities for P[A,B,C] are symmetric with respect to the binary 
values of these variables, the odd moments are zero and (A1)  reduces to 
 
P[A,B,C] =  
1
8 [1 + AB<AB> + BC<BC> + CA<CA>]                                                                            (A9) 
 
In this case, satisfaction of the two inequalities (A6) and (A7) gives a necessary and sufficient condition 
for a valid third-order distribution. This proves the following theorem: 
 
Existence Theorem: A necessary condition for a valid third-order probability distribution P[A,B,C] to 
exist that gives by marginalization three specified second-order distributions P[A,B], P[A,C] and P[B,C] 
is that the four inequalities (A2-A5) are all satisfied, or, equivalently, the two inequalities in (A6) and 
(A7) are satisfied. If the joint probabilities for P[A,B,C] are symmetric with respect to flipping the signs 
of all three variables, then satisfaction of the inequalities (A6) and (A7) gives a necessary and sufficient 
condition. 
 
If we have four binary stochastic variables A, B, C and D with a fourth-order distribution P[A,B,C,D], 
then by marginalization, the two third-order distributions for (A,B,C) and (B,C,D) exist. The Existence 
Theorem then implies that (A7) holds and so does (A6) with A replaced by D. Summing these two 
inequalities then implies an inequality of the form of the 1969 CHSH inequality in (11): 
 
| <AB> −<AC> | + | <DB> + <DC> |  ≤  2                                                                                            (A10) 
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This inequality is therefore a necessary condition for the existence of a fourth-order distribution for 
(A,B,C,D) that is compatible with the second-order distributions for the pairs (A,B), (A,C), (D,B) and 
(D,C). If inequality (A10) is not satisfied, then at least one of the joint probabilities for (A,B,C,D) is 
negative and so a valid fourth-order joint distribution P[A,B,C,D] does not exist. If it did, then all four 
third-order marginal distributions would exist, contradicting the assumed violation of inequality (A10). 
Three other similar but distinct necessary conditions can be obtained by examining permutations of A, B, 
C and D in (A10). Using (A8), these four inequalities can also be expressed in terms of second-order joint 
and first-order marginal probabilities to give the counterparts of the four inequalities in Clauser and Horne 
(1974) and Fine (1982). 
 
Here is a simple example motivated by one in Vorob’ev (1962) that illustrates the Existence Theorem. 
Consider binary stochastic variables A, B and C that have second-order joint distributions as in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Probability distributions P[A,B], P[B,C] and P[C,A]. 
 
P[A,B]   A= + 1   A= −1 P[B,C]   B= + 1   B= −1 P[C,A]   C= + 1   C= −1 
B= + 1         
1
2             0 C= + 1        0             
1
2  A= + 1         
1
2            0 
B= −1         0             
1
2  C= −1         
1
2             0 A= −1         0            
1
2  
 
The first and second moments of A, B and C are <A>=<B>=<C>=0 and <AB>=<CA>=1 and <BC>= −1.  
Substitution of these moments shows that inequality (A7) is satisfied but that inequality (A6) is violated. 
Therefore, a valid third-order distribution P[A,B,C] does not exist and there must be at least one negative 
probability. The mathematical expression for it in (A1) gives: 
 
P[A,B,C] =  
1
8 [1 + AB  −BC + CA+ ABCµ3]                                                                                        (A11) 
 
where µ3 = <ABC>. This third moment is bounded by 1 so the probability for A= −1 and B= C= 1 is 
negative.  
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